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How aid should be allocated among developing countries and under what circumstances it can
be used to promote growth have been discussed extensively in the literature on aid eﬀectiveness,
and yet there is no clear answer to these questions, as will be seen below. As in Easterly (1999),
even in the 1990s, economists in international ﬁnancial institutions were applying the Harrod-
Domar model, which had long since been discarded in the academic literature. The model
calculates investment requirements for a target growth rate but unfortunately does not oﬀer
any clue to understanding how aid works. This episode illustrates that donors have devoted
considerable resources to encouraging development and reducing poverty in recipient countries,
without knowing how to improve aid eﬀectiveness.
The question at issue is the relationship between policy and aid eﬀectiveness. Burnside and
Dollar (2000) ﬁnd that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good
policies, but has little eﬀect in the presence of poor policies.1 Their ﬁnding suggests that the
poverty-eﬃcient allocation of aid depends on the quality of policy and that countries with better
policies should receive more aid inﬂows (Collier and Dollar, 2002). However, some researchers
provide empirical evidence that contradicts this ﬁnding (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Lensink
and White, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Easterly et al., 2004; Roodman, 2007; Rajan and
Subramanian, 2008). These studies focus on inter-recipient allocation, which has the maximum
eﬀect on growth or poverty reduction. At present, therefore, we know little about the poverty-
eﬃcient, inter-recipient allocation.
We also lack insight into what constitutes eﬃcient inter-sectoral allocation in a recipient
country. Many papers provide empirical evidence that transport and other economic infrastruc-
ture has a positive eﬀect on growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Gupta et al., 2005; Neanidis and
Varvarigos, 2007; Canning and Pedroni, 2008). Recently, however, donors have been focusing
on pro-poor expenditure (PPE) in sectors such as health and education, rather than on infras-
tructure (Paternostro et al., 2007). Donors place greater emphasis on Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), and hence allocate more to social sectors. As a result, economic sectors receive
1Although they focus on ﬁscal, monetary and trade policies, other national characteristics such as good insti-
tutions and corruption may also aﬀect aid eﬀectiveness. See, for example, Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Collier
and Dollar (2002), Mosley et al. (2004) and Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008).
2a relatively small proportion of total aid provided by most donors.
The purpose of this paper is to show how to make aid eﬀective by presenting a simple
and tractable framework for analyzing aid policies. As we explain below, we explicitly model
public investment, which contributes growth, as well as PPE, and hence the model takes into
account inter-sectoral allocation. This model can be used to evaluate the policy of donors such as
Japan, which consistently places importance on the role of infrastructure investment in recipient
countries.
A distinguishing feature of this study is that we consider a process in which aid-dependent
countries ultimately become independent. In fact, countries such as Japan and Singapore were
dependent on foreign aid in the early stages of their own development. Today, of course, Japan
is one of the world’s largest donors of aid and Singapore is entirely aid-independent. These
examples demonstrate that countries can become less dependent on aid if they achieve rapid
growth (while others may become more aid-dependent, if they experience low growth). In
theory, there are many growth models in which aid is a determining factor, but they assume
that recipient countries continue to receive aid indeﬁnitely in a steady state (Lensink and White,
2001; Chatterjee et al., 2003; Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2007; Neanidis and Varvarigos, 2007;
Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis, 2008). As mentioned above, if recipients sustain growth, they
become less dependent on aid. Hence, we assume in our model that aid-dependent countries
ultimately become independent.
The second feature of this study is that we focus on the eﬀect of total aid over the long run
rather than on the inﬂuence of short-term aid ﬂows. In reality, aid ﬂows vary across countries
and over time because the amount required to cover the costs of investment and PPE varies,
as does tax revenue. It is not appropriate to assume that the eﬀect of a dollar increase in aid
is constant across countries and over time.2 To avoid this, we use total aid over the long run
rather than aid ﬂows in the steady state.
More importantly, inter-sectoral allocation varies across recipient countries. Aid directed
at infrastructure is greater in some countries than in others. Moreover, even though public
investment contributes to economic growth, the point when projects yield returns varies across
2Some studies provide evidence for diminishing returns to aid. See, for example, Lensink and White (2001)
and Collier and Dollar (2002).
3projects (Clemens et al., 2004). Note that PPE may also have a positive impact on productivity
in the long run because it reduces infant mortality rates, as shown in Mosley et al. (2004)
and Gomanee et al. (2005). In addition, the extent to which aid ﬁnances growth-enhancing
investment varies, depending on the recipient’s tax revenue. Hence, examining the short-term
relationship between the amount of aid and growth rates does not necessarily provide useful
information about aid eﬀectiveness. In this paper, to clarify the eﬀect of a dollar increase in
aid, we assume that every year recipients require a constant level of PPE, which is calculated
by an ex ante poverty level and a target level, and that PPE and infrastructure investment
are ﬁnanced by tax revenue and foreign aid (aid is used if tax revenue is insuﬃcient). In this
framework, we can measure aid eﬀectiveness by calculating the growth eﬀects of total aid over
the long run (growth rate/total aid).
In the next section, we present a theoretical model in which a recipient government uses tax
revenue to pay for the costs of infrastructure and PPE. Foreign aid compensates for deﬁcits; as
long as the economy grows, tax revenue increases and hence deﬁcits and aid inﬂows decrease.
In this model, the timing of independence (the point at which donors stop giving aid) depends
on the level of poverty, the rate of tax, the eﬃciency of government, population growth and the
target rate of growth.
In Section 3, we derive the target growth rate that maximizes the impact of total aid on
growth. High target growth rates require more aid for infrastructure initially but higher growth
rates increase tax revenue later and enable a recipient to become aid-independent more quickly.
Hence, higher target growth rates do not necessarily increase total aid in the long run. We ﬁnd
that there is a target growth rate that maximizes the ratio of steady-state growth rate to total
aid over the entire period. In this paper, this ratio is used as the measure of aid eﬀectiveness.
We calculate the desirable target growth rate numerically using parameters for the economic
conditions of recipient countries.
In Section 4, to extract more practical information from the model, at given rates of growth,
we examine what policies are eﬀective and can accelerate independence from foreign aid. We ﬁnd
that a rise in target growth rates can improve aid eﬀectiveness without creating a large ﬁnancial
burden because it accelerates the independence. We also examine the eﬀect of governance and
4that of tax rates on aid eﬀectiveness. In Section 5, we evaluate Japanese aid, which supports
infrastructure investment in Asian developing countries, and conduct experiments to investigate
the eﬃcient allocation of aid. Our experiments suggest that governance aﬀects aid eﬀectiveness
but its impact is much smaller than that of target growth rates. Unlike the poverty-eﬃcient
allocation in Collier and Dollar (2002), which emphasize the importance of a good policy envi-
ronment for aid to work, our result implies that donors can improve aid eﬀectiveness by giving
aid to slow-growing economies, even if these recipients have bad policies and institutions.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Basic set-up of the model
We develop a simple growth model to examine the relationship between a target growth rate
and aid inﬂows required to balance the government budget. The representative, inﬁnite-lived









where ct is consumption at time t, 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount rate and γ < 1 (γ de-
termines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution). We consider the representative household
in the economy to simplify the analysis; however, we implicitly assume shortages of govern-
ment services such as healthcare and primary education. We introduce transfer payments that
compensate for the lack of services. This income transfer represents PPE. In addition, the gov-
ernment spends on public capital that can improve the productivity of private factor inputs. If
tax revenue is insuﬃcient, donors provide ﬁnancial assistance. We denote the per capita aid at
time t by at, and aid ﬂows to this recipient at time t are given by
atLt = sLt + IG
t − ϵτYt (2)
where Lt is population at t, IG
t is public investment, Yt is national income, τ is the tax rate on
income, ϵ ∈ (0,1] represents the eﬃciency of the government, and s is the per capita transfer
5(PPE), which is constant over time.3 The eﬃciency of government ϵ, which measures the level of
governance, is the proportion of tax revenue that is actually used for PPE and public investment;
1−ϵ is the proportion of revenue that is wasted because of corruption and red tape. No resource
is wasted only if ϵ = 1, and small values of ϵ correspond to weak governance. This implies that
ﬁnancing aid projects and programs are ineﬃcient because of corrupt oﬃcials and red tape in
countries where governance is weak.4
Each household uses labor, private capital and public capital, which is provided to producers
without user charges. The accumulation equation for private capital Kt is
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + (1 − τ)Yt − ctLt (3)
and the accumulation equation for public capital Gt is
Gt+1 = (1 − δG)Gt + IG
t = (1 − δG)Gt + ϵτYt + atLt − sLt (4)
where δ and δG are depreciation rates for private capital and public capital, respectively. Since
the government transfer represents goods and services directly given to people suﬀering from a
lack of basic needs, s does not contribute to the accumulation of private capital in (3). While ϵ
aﬀects the accumulation of public capital in (4), it does not change tax revenue and hence does
not have an impact on after-tax income in (3). The second equality in (4) implies that aid ﬂows
shown in (2) compensate for the lack of tax revenue.
The production function is
Yt = ytLt = Akσ
t G1−σ
t Lt (5)
where 0 < σ < 1, yt = Yt/Lt and kt = Kt/Lt. This production function is used in Futagami
3In practice, total PPE can change over time. As an economy grows, PPE may decrease; however, if growth
exacerbates inequality, PPE may increase. Even if income distribution does not change, population growth can
increase the population below the poverty line and then PPE increases. In this paper, by assuming that the per
capita transfer is constant, we examine the eﬀect of an increase in total PPE, which is caused by population
growth, and that of an increase in tax revenue, which is caused by economic growth.
4Here, we assume that the wasteful use of resources is proportionate to the size of government revenue. While
aid resources from donors may also be wasted, we assume that tax revenue is more likely than aid to be wasted.
There are two justiﬁcations for this assumption. First, aid can mitigate the incentives for social groups to engage
in rent-seeking activities as shown in Svensson (2000). Second, repayment obligations can prevent recipients from
wasting aid resources in the case of loan, which is used for infrastructure aid. Note that, even in our setting, this
ineﬃciency makes donors overpay corrupt governments for given levels of PPE and infrastructure investment.
6et al. (1993). We assume that the rate of population growth is n ≥ 0; hence Lt+1 = Lt(1 + n).
From (3), we obtain kt+1 + ct + nkt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + (1 − τ)yt, which is the household budget
constraint.
Each household maximizes (1) subject to the constraint above, given the level of public
capital at every t. The solution must satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions and the transversality
condition. The ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
c
γ−1
t = βλt+1 (6)
λt+1(1 + n) = βλt+2{1 − δ + (1 − τ)σAkσ−1
t+1 G1−σ
t+1 } (7)















































Equations (8), (9) and (10) describe the dynamic behavior of the economy. The remainder of
this paper focuses on a balanced growth path, in which kt and ct grow at the constant rate g,
which is the target growth rate of Gt determined by donors (as will be explained below). We
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) 1
1−γ 1 + n
1 − δ + (1 − τ)Ax1−σ
t − zt
(11)









(1 + g)(1 + n)
1 − δ + (1 − τ)Ax1−σ
t − zt
(12)
The stationary solution of the system (xt+1 = xt = x, zt+1 = zt = z) shows that, from (11),






1 − δ + (1 − τ)σAx1−σ) 1
1−γ (1 + n) (13)
and, from (12),
z = −(1 + g)(1 + n) + 1 − δ + (1 − τ)Ax1−σ (14)
Equations (13) and (14) determine the steady state values of x and z. Unlike growth models with
public capital such as Barro (1990), the government does not have to ﬁnance public investment
through taxation on domestic income alone. As described in (4), foreign aid compensates for
the lack of tax revenue. Since our purpose is to evaluate aid policies, we assume that donors
control the target growth rate g along a path determined by (10).
Assumption The donor chooses a sequence of aid ﬂows {a0,a1,...,aT} to achieve the constant
target growth rate of public capital g.
This assumption implies that the donor gives aid to the recipient from time 0 to T. As will
be shown, T represents the time period over which the donor gives aid and depends on the
target growth rate g, population growth rate n, tax rate τ, and transfer s. Suppose that at time
t = 0 tax revenue is not enough to ﬁnance PPE and infrastructure investment. As this economy
grows, tax revenue increases. At time t = T, the recipient government raises enough money
and becomes ﬁnancially independent from donors. This paper focuses on the period from time
0 to T. To ensure consistency, however, we assume that after time T the recipient government
gives resources to other poorer countries and retains the target growth rate g (the recipient will
eventually become a donor).
From (10), for the steady state values of x and z, the per capita aid at time t is given by







− ϵτAx−σG0(1 + g)t (15)
8where G0 and L0 are, respectively, public capital and population at time 0. We deﬁne T as the
earliest possible time t that satisﬁes at ≤ 0.5 The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of (15) is
the per capita transfer, the second term represents the cost of public investment and the third
term denotes tax revenue. We assume that a0 > 0. As the recipient country grows, tax revenue
increases and reduces the burden of foreign aid; once at ≤ 0 holds at time T, aid is not necessary
after that. Thus, T represents how long the donor gives aid to the recipient. From (15), aid
inﬂows at each t are given by
atLt = (g + δG)G0(1 + g)t − (ϵτAx−σG0(1 + g)t − s)L0(1 + n)t (16)
The second term of the right-hand side suggests the following: 1) when tax revenue is not
suﬃcient because of low income, as the population increases, aid inﬂows increase; 2) once tax
revenue outweighs the cost of PPE, as the population and income increase, aid inﬂows decrease
steadily. Thus, population growth increases aid inﬂows when income is low. However, if tax
revenue outweighs the cost of PPE, population growth as well as income growth decreases aid
inﬂows. Even when n = 0, as long as g + δG < ϵτAx−σL0 holds at t = 0, aid decreases as tax
revenue increases. In this paper, we focus on the case where aid decreases to zero. If n > 0, aid
surely decreases to zero. Figure 1 illustrates a time path of aid inﬂows (time t on the horizontal
axis and atLt on the vertical axis).
The time path of aid depends on parameters such as the rate of population growth and the
rate of tax. As illustrated in Figure 1, in this model the amount of aid varies over time while
the economy grows at a constant rate. This suggests that it is not appropriate to measure aid
eﬀectiveness based on the impact of aid ﬂows in the short run. In this paper, we measure aid






(1 + r)t (17)
where r is the interest rate, which is exogenous. Note that AID depends on T. Since infras-
tructure aid has a negative eﬀect on T, an increase in aid ﬂows does not necessarily increase
5In (15), a time t that satisﬁes at = 0 is not necessarily an integer. However, by deﬁnition, T is an integer in
the discrete time model.
9AID.
3 Target growth rate and aid eﬀectiveness
This paper follows the literature and measures aid eﬀectiveness using the growth impact of aid.
Since economic growth reduces poverty, as shown in Ravallion and Chen (1997) and Dollar and
Kraay (2002), it is appropriate to use the growth impact of aid to measure aid eﬀectiveness.
However, some forms of aid have no direct impact on growth; a substantial amount of aid is
directed at PPE sectors, which contribute to welfare rather than growth, as demonstrated by
Mosley et al. (2004) and Gomanee et al. (2005). They show that aid for PPE sectors improves
infant mortality in recipient countries. Aid for PPE sectors does not promote growth (at least
not in the short run) and hence there is a tradeoﬀ between growth and welfare. Even if all
types of aid ultimately reduce poverty, the timing of the eﬀects varies. Given the variety of
aid objectives and the diﬀerence in inter-sectoral aid allocation across recipients, it is diﬃcult
to measure aid eﬀectiveness. To address this problem, we assume that, in each period, aid is
ﬁrst used for PPE and the remainder is allocated to infrastructure, which contributes to growth.
Consequently, a high priority is given to direct poverty-reducing expenditures in each period.
There is a required amount of aid for PPE; the amount s is determined by the level of poverty
and the target level of poverty reduction. Moreover, we use the eﬀect of total aid in (17) rather
than the short-run eﬀect of aid ﬂows.
In what follows, we ﬁnd a target growth rate that maximizes g/AID. The denominator is
total aid in (17), which depends on g, as shown in (16), and hence both the numerator and the
denominator are dependent on g. Note that the eﬀect of g on AID is not monotonous. While a
high rate of g increases aid ﬂows in earlier periods, it negatively aﬀects T. Thus, g aﬀects how
much donors give aid in each period, how long donors give aid to the recipient, and the steady
state value of x. This makes it diﬃcult to solve the maximization problem analytically. Below,
we will ﬁnd the desirable target growth rate numerically by specifying parameters.6
We assume that the per capita cost for PPE depends on the level of poverty. Speciﬁcally,
6The growth rate g can take any positive value. For practical reasons, we focus on the range between 0 to 100
percent. Although a rate of growth near 100 percent may seem unrealistic, it is feasible in a case in which many
donors give aid to a very small recipient.
10we assume that the level of s is determined by




The equation shows that s depends on the ex ante head-count ratio h0, the target level of head-
count ratio h, the poverty line z and the poverty gap ratio pg, which is the mean shortfall from
the poverty line. By deﬁnition, pg·z·Lt represents the amount required for all individuals living
below the poverty line to consume z. Note that (h0 − h)/h0 is the degree to which poverty
reduction has been attained (h0 ≥ h > 0 by deﬁnition); if h = 0 (there is no poverty after giving
aid), (h0 − h)/h0 = 1 and the per capita cost for PPE is pg · z · Lt. Thus, given the levels of
h0, pg and z, the target level h determines s from (18); s is large when the target level of h
is low and the extent of poverty is severe (pg and h0 are high). In this paper, we assume that
(h0 − h)/h0 = 0.5 as in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Goal 1 of which involves
halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people suﬀering from extreme poverty and
hunger.
Our choices of parameters are given in Table 1. The rate of population growth n is assumed
to be equal to the mean annual rate for middle- and low-income countries between 1990 and 2006
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) CD-ROM 2008. We use data from the World
Bank’s PovcalNet for poverty measures: the poverty line is assumed to be equal to $1.25/day (z
is $456/year), and the poverty gap pg equal to the mean of the 1990 value and the 2005 value.
PovcalNet is based on estimates from the following six regions: East Asia and Paciﬁc, Europe
and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia,
Sub-Saharan Africa.7 The rate of tax is set equal to 0.1. The value is based on the average ratio
of tax revenue to GDP for low-income countries in 2000 from WDI. We set the depreciation
rate at 0.05 for private capital and at 0.025 for public capital, which generally has a longer
service life.8 Data on the eﬃciency of government is not available although there appears to be
a widespread belief that governments in developing countries are ineﬃcient. We assume that
the government wastes 50 percent of tax revenue. Our choices of other parameters are standard.
7See PovcalNet (http://go.worldbank.org/NT2A1XUWP0) for details. The value of pg in Table 1 is the average
of the six regions.
8Fraumeni (1997) shows depreciation rates and service lives for many types of assets.
11The preference parameter γ is set at -1.5, as in Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007). We set the
discount rate in (17) at 0.1.
In this model, there is a restriction on the parameter σ, which determines the output elasticity
of each input. As shown in (5), to focus on a balanced growth path, we assume that the sum
of the output elasticity of private capital and that of public capital is one. Hence, if we specify
the output elasticity of public capital, then that of public capital σ is determined. There are
many estimates for the output elasticity of public capital. The estimate that has earned the
greatest attention was produced by Aschauer (1989). His estimate based on U.S. data is 0.39.
Ford and Poret (1991) use data on ten OECD countries; their estimates range from 0.29 to 0.77.
There are also papers on low-income countries. For example, Canning (1999) ﬁnds that the
output elasticity of communication infrastructure is 0.14 using panel data for a cross-section of
countries. In Binswanger et al. (1993), which use data from India, the elasticity of road with
respect to agricultural output is about 0.2.9 There are also many papers on the elasticity of
private capital. For example, the estimates of Senhadji (2000), who uses time-series data on
66 countries, range from 0.13 to 1.00, and the average is 0.55. Thus, the estimates vary across
papers and countries. In this paper, we set the output elasticity of public capital at 0.35, which is
somewhat smaller than the estimate of Aschauer (1989). Then, the elasticity of private capital σ
is 0.65. Assuming competitive markets implies that the elasticity of public capital (1−σ = 0.35)
is equal to the labor share of income; this value is consistent with the estimates of the labor
share in developing countries, which is smaller than in OECD countries (Diwan, 2001; Harrison,
2002).
Technology parameter A and the initial values of inputs G0/L0 are scale variables, which
determine T in (15). We set A = 2, G0 = 0.4, and L0 = 1. In this case, we can set a
realistic target growth rate. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the target growth rate
g (horizontal axis) and aid eﬀectiveness g/AID (vertical axis). In this ﬁgure, the eﬃcient level
of g that maximizes g/AID is around 0.25. As Figure 3 shows, T (vertical axis) is minimized
when g (horizontal axis) is around 0.18 to 0.23. This explains the desirable target growth rate
in Figure 2.
9See Straub (2008) for a recent survey of the literature.
12In this example, we obtain T = 36 for the level of g that minimizes T and this implies that
the recipient country can be independent if the growth rate is 0.18 for 36 years. As mentioned
above, this result depends on parameters. If technology parameter A is set at 2.5 instead of 2, we
obtain T = 29 instead of T = 36. Our result that donors have to give aid for 36 years even if they
choose the ideal target growth rate is a realistic prediction. Note that Japan experienced high
growth rates (about 10 percent) after the Second World War and received aid from donors for
about two decades.10 This fact suggests that 36 years is a realistic length of time for recipients
when the level of technology and the initial stock of (per capita) public capital are lower.
The key result from Figure 2 is that, when donors choose a large g, they have to give more
aid in the short run but can make aid more eﬀective in the long run. This suggests that choosing
a small g makes aid ineﬀective.
Since it is diﬃcult to solve the problem analytically, we perform several numerical exercises
(instead of comparative static exercises) to investigate the eﬀect of a change in variables such as
s, G0, ϵ, and n on the eﬃcient level of g (and on T corresponding to the level of g). Initially, all
the parameters are ﬁxed at the levels in Table 1. We obtain the following result: 1) the eﬃcient
level of g increases (the corresponding T increases) as transfer s increases; 2) the eﬃcient level
of g is large (the corresponding T is large) when the initial stock of public capital G0 is small; 3)
the eﬃcient level of g increases (the corresponding T decreases) as the eﬃciency of government
ϵ improves; 4) the eﬃcient level of g is large (the corresponding T is small) when the rate of
population growth is high. These results suggest that donors should choose a large value of g
for recipients suﬀering from extreme poverty and a lack of infrastructure. We show that aid is
more eﬀective in recipients with eﬃcient governments (T decreases as ϵ rises, as in the third
result). This seems to be consistent with the Burnside and Dollar (2000) result, in which aid
works only in recipients with good policies. However, our result does not necessarily imply
that donors should choose a large value of g for (allocate more aid resources to) recipients with
eﬃcient governments because in those countries aid eﬀectiveness is relatively high, even with a
small value of g. We discuss this result in more detail in the next two sections.
10Japan received GARIOA funds, which were used to supply food, petroleum, fertilizers and medical supplies,
from the United States since 1946. In the period 1953-1966, Japan also received loans from the World Bank and
invested in infrastructure.
134 Actual aid policy and aid eﬀectiveness
In the section above, we have found a target growth rate that maximizes the impact of aid on
growth. In practice, however, even if choosing a high target growth rate is more eﬃcient, it
is often diﬃcult to sustain that rate because donors have a limited budget. In this section, to
provide useful policy implications, we examine what policies can improve aid eﬀectiveness given
the growth rate and parameters that characterize the recipient economy in Table 1. We ﬁrst
examine the eﬀect of a change in g from the current level. If a small increase in g has a large
positive eﬀect on aid eﬀectiveness, it suggests that the present level of infrastructure investment
is too low; in this case, donors can improve aid eﬀectiveness at no extra cost. Finding the
relationship between the additional cost of an increase in g and its beneﬁt is therefore useful for
policymakers.
Generally speaking, the current level of infrastructure investment is not enough to sustain
the eﬃcient level of g derived in the section above. The proportion of all bilateral aid targeting
the economic infrastructure sector is only 10.8 percent in 2005; the proportion of all bilateral
aid targeting the social sector is 30.8 percent; and the proportion of all bilateral aid directed at
debt reduction is 28.5 percent.11 Denoting the eﬃcient level of g as g∗, the model shows that
an increase in g has a positive eﬀect on aid eﬀectiveness as long as g < g∗ holds as in Figure 2.
Hence, the low level of aid that goes to the economic infrastructure sector suggests that aid is
not eﬀective.
Table 2 reports the target growth rate g in Column 1, the corresponding T in Column 2,
AID (1 in the benchmark case) in Column 3 and aid eﬀectiveness in Column 4. As a benchmark,
we use g = 0.027, which is the average rate of growth for low- and middle-income countries in
the period 1990-2006, from WDI (other parameters we use are given in Table 1). This growth
rate is clearly lower than g∗ in Figure 2; the corresponding T is more than 100 years. As the
results in the table show, we can decrease T to 36 by increasing g to 0.18. Note that, while AID
increases as g rises to 0.05, AID decreases as g increases as long as 0.05 < g < 0.18. Moreover,
AID is smaller than the benchmark value for g ∈ [0.08,0.023] in this table; for g = 0.18, AID is
minimized and AID is increasing with g if g > 0.18. Aid eﬀectiveness in Column 4 is increasing
11See Development Aid at a Glance: Statistics by Region 2007 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/111051032563).
14with g if g < 0.25 and decreases with g if g > 0.25. This numerical exercise shows that even a
small increase in AID can decrease T dramatically (a 0.7 percent increase in AID decreases T
by 41 years). If donors can accept a higher burden in the short run, they can decrease AID,
which is a burden in the long run. In other words, if the target growth rate is low because of
budget limitations, it has a large negative eﬀect on aid eﬀectiveness.
There is a tradeoﬀ between a short-run cost and a long-run cost. If donors cut the spending
for infrastructure investment in the short run, it increases the spending in the long run. To
decrease AID, donors should increase spending on infrastructure in the short run (as long as
g < g∗ holds). In practice, donors tend to be focused on their annual budget. For example,
Japan, the largest donor in the mid-1990s, has scaled back its aid budgets recently because of
a decrease in tax revenue.12 As long as donors consider their annual budget constraints, an
increase in s leads to a decrease in infrastructure investment, which decreases the target growth
rate, and hence aid becomes less eﬀective. Thus, even if it is possible to increase aid eﬀectiveness
without increasing costs in the long run, in practice it is diﬃcult to improve aid eﬀectiveness by
increasing infrastructure investment.
As suggested by Mosley et al. (2004) and Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), the impact of public
spending depends on governance and the level of corruption. In our model, the parameter ϵ
measures the eﬃciency of the government, which depends on the level of corruption and red tape.
Now we show the impact of ϵ on aid eﬀectiveness. Table 3 shows the eﬃciency of government in
Column 1, the corresponding T in Column 2, AID (1 in the benchmark case) in Column 3, and
aid eﬀectiveness in Column 4. As a benchmark, we use g = 0.027 as before (other parameters
are given in Table 1). As the results in the table show, T decreases to 110 and AID decreases
by 1.4 percent if ϵ increases from 0.5 to 0.6; T and AID decrease with a rise in ϵ. Since g is
constant in this case, a decrease in AID makes aid more eﬀective. If ϵ increases to 1, which
implies that the government is eﬃcient, AID decreases by 7.2 percent and T decreases from
116 to 90. To obtain the same eﬀect on T, donors have to increase g to 0.04 (see the third line
in Table 2); in this case, AID increases by 0.6 percent. In reality, it is diﬃcult to improve the
eﬃciency of government. Hence, the results in Table 3 show the diﬀerence in aid eﬀectiveness
12See Kawai and Takagi (2004).
15across recipient countries with diﬀerent levels of ϵ.
Our model also shows that the tax rate τ aﬀects aid eﬀectiveness. Developing countries
generally have diﬃculty in collecting tax revenue. The ratio of revenue to GDP is smaller in
low-income countries than it is in developed countries (Tanzi and Zee, 2000). In Table 1, we
set τ = 0.1; as the tax rate rises, aid ﬂows (at time t) required to sustain the same level of
infrastructure investment decrease. Table 4 shows tax rates in Column 1, the corresponding T
in Column 2, AID (1 in the benchmark case) in Column 3, and aid eﬀectiveness in Column
4. As before, the other parameters we use are given in Table 1. The results in Table 4 show
that a 5 percent rise in τ (starting from the benchmark) reduces T by 11 years and AID by
2.5 percent. While T decreases with a rise in τ if τ < 0.35, it increases with τ if τ > 0.35.
Thus, T and AID are minimized and aid eﬀectiveness is maximized when τ = 0.35. This result
suggests that there is a tax rate that maximizes aid eﬀectiveness.13 The reason why T increases
consistently with tax rates higher than 0.35 is that the steady state level of public capital x
determined by (13) and (14) is too high. For a high tax rate, to sustain high productivity, the
economy must have a high level of x and hence a large amount of aid inﬂows. In this case, T
must also be large. As discussed above, for low-income countries, it is diﬃcult to collect revenue
and tax rates higher than 0.35 are unrealistic. Hence, it is unlikely that T and AID increase
as tax rates increase (because the actual tax rate is likely to be lower than the tax rate that
maximizes aid eﬀectiveness).
The results in Tables 2-4 show that choosing a high target growth rate, making the gov-
ernment more eﬃcient, and raising tax revenue can decrease T. These three policies result in
more eﬀective aid. However, the eﬀects of the three policies vary. A high target growth rate
results in a high growth rate of consumption and increases the steady-state levels of x (public
capital/private capital) and z (consumption/private capital) determined by equations (13) and
(14). On the other hand, the eﬃciency of government does not aﬀect the steady-state levels
of x and z because ϵ does not appear in (13) and (14). A high tax rate increases the steady
state level of x but does not aﬀect that of z. Consequently, only a high target growth rate
13Note that this tax rate is equal to the output elasticity of public capital, which is 0.35 as in Table 1. This is
consistent with the result of Barro (1990). He shows that the growth-maximizing tax rate is equal to the output
elasticity of public services.
16increases both public capital and consumption while the eﬃciency of government and tax rates
do not aﬀect consumption (tax rates aﬀect the level of public capital only). Hence, when these
three policies achieve the same level of T, choosing a high target growth rate needs more aid
resources than the other two policies because it increases the level of consumption whereas the
other two policies do not. The diﬀerence between improving the eﬃciency of government and
raising tax revenue is that only the latter increases the level of public capital. Hence, improving
the eﬃciency of government requires fewer aid resources to shorten the period of giving aid.14
5 Evaluation of the impact of aid in six Asian countries
5.1 The role of Japan’s aid
The parameters we use in the previous section reﬂect the average developing country. In this sec-
tion, we evaluate Japanese aid directed at economic infrastructure in Asia, where some recipients
achieve high rates of economic growth.
As mentioned above, while many studies provide empirical evidence that infrastructure pos-
itively aﬀects economic growth, the proportion of aid targeting economic infrastructure is small.
Among all bilateral donors, Japan is the exception. Japan has had a traditional strength in
giving aid for economic infrastructure (Cassen and Associates, 1994; Kawai and Takagi, 2004).
As in the OECD’s International Development Statistics (IDS), the percentage of total Japanese
bilateral aid that goes to economic infrastructure is on average about 50 percent (calculated
using annual data, 1990-2007). The proportion is 56 percent in South Asia and 20 percent in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Although multilateral aid and recipient governments also ﬁnance infras-
tructure investment, as will be seen, the proportion of Japan’s aid is not negligible. In this
section, we use data for China, Indonesia, Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, and Bangladesh.
Japan was the largest bilateral donor for these countries in the 1990s.15 In this paper, economic
infrastructure includes the following sectors: transport, telecommunications, energy, and water.
In Table 5, ρJ is the proportion of Japanese aid for infrastructure in each recipient country.
14This does not necessarily imply that improving the eﬃciency of government is the best way to improve aid
eﬀectiveness.
15Also in Malaysia, Korea and Singapore, Japan used to be the largest bilateral donor. However, in these
countries, a0 > 0 in (15) does not hold because they have a small value of pg in 1990 (t = 0)
17This proportion represents Japan’s contribution to “the engine of growth” in our model and is
calculated as follows. The model shows that, in a balanced growth path, the growth rate of public
capital g is equal to the growth rate of income and that of consumption, and IG
t /Gt = g + δG
from (2), (5) and (10). Assuming that g is the growth rate in the real world and δG = 0.025,
we obtain IG
t /Gt. Public investment IG
t is ﬁnanced not only by Japanese aid but also by other
donors and domestic sources, and hence the proportion of Japanese investment (ρJ) in all public
capital formation of the recipient (IG
t ) indicates the contribution of Japanese aid to IG
t /Gt,
which is calculated from data on the growth rate g and the depreciation rate δG. For example,
if ρJ = 0.2, it implies that Japan’s contribution to the engine of growth IG
t /Gt is 20 percent.
Below, we assume that the proportion of Japan’s aid is constant from the beginning and calculate
T and g/AID with and without Japanese aid. Using data on aid from the OECD’s Creditor
Reporting System (the average over the period 1986-1990) and on government expenditure from
the Asian Development Bank’s Key Indicators for Asia and the Paciﬁc (expenditure by function,
central government in 1990), we calculate ρJ. Note that government expenditure for economic
infrastructure is available only for the central government. Also note that while “oﬀ-budget”
aid has been prevalent, some donors adopt an “on-budget” approach, such as general budget
support. If aid projects are “on-budget,” infrastructure investment by the recipient government
is partly ﬁnanced by foreign sources and then the sum of infrastructure aid from all donors and
the government spending on infrastructure is overstated (ρJ is understated). The accuracy of
the variable is open to question. However, our focus is not on the size of ρJ itself but on the
impact of ρJ on T and g/AID; we examine whether the relative sizes of ρJ across recipients are
associated with their impacts.
Table 5 shows the parameters for each country and the corresponding T and g/AID with
and without Japanese aid. For each country, the ﬁrst line gives the rate of per capita GDP
growth, the rate of population growth, the initial stock of infrastructure, the poverty gap ratio,
and the proportion of Japanese investment in total public capital formation. The second line
shows the corresponding T and aid eﬀectiveness; g, T and g/AID in the case without Japanese
aid are given in the third line. Parameters not shown in this table are the same as those in
Table 1; we assume that preference and production parameters, the rate of tax, and the size
18of population at t = 0 are the same for all six countries. We calculate g and n using annual
data for each country and they are the average over the period 1990-2006. The initial level of
infrastructure is set equal to 0.5 (greater than the world average 0.4 in Table 1) for Thailand,
0.2 for China, Philippines and Indonesia, and 0.1 for Bangladesh and Cambodia.16 For China
and Indonesia, we use data on the poverty gap for rural area, where people are poorer (data on
the poverty gap is available for rural and urban areas for those two countries alone).
The results show that, given the growth rate in the real world, each of these countries must
receive aid over the long term. Even high-growth countries such as China and Thailand need
aid for about 100 years; T is very large for Philippines because of the low growth rate, and
for Bangladesh and Indonesia because of both low growth rates and high poverty gap ratios.
Japan’s contribution ρJ is 0.66 in Cambodia, which implies that growth would be much lower
without Japan’s assistance. In contrast, the ρJ for Bangladesh is very low and hence Japan’s
contribution has little eﬀect on g and T. For China and Thailand, ρJ is relatively large, but
it is less than 15 percent for Philippines and Indonesia. Interestingly, the impact of Japan’s
contribution is not necessarily associated with the relative size of ρJ. The impact of ρJ on T
is much larger in Philippines and Indonesia than in China, where ρJ is larger. The impact of
ρJ on aid eﬀectiveness is large (a 75 percent increase) in Philippines, but is small (a 31 percent
increase) in China. The reason for this is as follows. If the growth rate is close to the eﬃcient
level, the eﬀect of a change in g is small, as shown in Tables 2 and 3. If the growth rate is low,
as it is in the Philippines, a small decrease in g has a very large eﬀect on g/AID and T. In
summary, aid eﬀectiveness is high in high-growth countries (Thailand, Cambodia and China)
and low in countries with low g (Philippines and Bangladesh). Without Japan’s contribution,
aid eﬀectiveness would be much lower in Cambodia (because of the scale of Japan’s support)
and Philippines (because of the low growth rate). These results conﬁrm that high growth rates
contribute to aid eﬀectiveness.
The results above raise an important question for donors: what is the eﬃcient inter-recipient
allocation? If the allocation decision of a donor has little eﬀect on aid eﬀectiveness in each
recipient, then donors should focus on recipients where aid will be eﬀective (this is the case
16Although this is a very rough calculation, it is based on data on telephone mainlines (per 100 people) and
paved roads (percent of total roads) from WDI.
19where aid eﬀectiveness is determined only by the recipient’s policies and institutions). However,
if aid eﬀectiveness depends on growth rates as we have shown, the answer is diﬀerent. If donors
invest substantial resources into infrastructure as Japan does, it has a positive eﬀect on growth
rates and hence improves aid eﬀectiveness. This impact on aid eﬀectiveness is larger in low-
growth economies, as shown in Table 2 (the impact on T is also larger in low-growth economies
as shown in Table 3). Hence, it is better to allocate more aid resources to low-growth countries.
5.2 How much does the eﬃciency of government matter?
Finally, we discuss the poverty-eﬃcient allocation of aid suggested by Collier and Dollar (2002).
Their eﬃcient inter-recipient allocation is calculated based on their empirical observations that
aid is eﬀective in countries with good policies. It suggests that to make aid more eﬀective donors
should allocate more aid to countries with good policies and institutions. In this subsection,
applying our model to six Asian countries, we examine whether aid is more eﬀective in countries
with more eﬃcient governments.
In Table 6, we show the eﬀect of a decrease in growth rates and the eﬀect of a change in
the eﬃciency of government. The ﬁrst two columns report T and g/AID from the second line
of Table 5 for each country (the benchmark). The second two columns show T and g/AID for
the case where g decreases by 1 percent. A decrease in g has a large eﬀect on T in low-growth
countries such as Bangladesh, Philippines and Indonesia. In these countries, a decrease in g
also has a large impact on aid eﬀectiveness. These results again suggest that aid directed at
economic infrastructure in low-growth countries can improve aid eﬀectiveness signiﬁcantly.
The eﬀects of a change in the eﬃciency of government are shown in the ﬁfth and the sixth
columns. The results show that a decrease in ϵ leads to an increase in T although it has little
impact on aid eﬀectiveness in the sixth column (even after we multiply g/AID by 100). The
impact of a decrease in ϵ on T is large in Philippines, which originally had a large T because of a
low-growth rate, and relatively small in China and Cambodia where growth rates are high. Only
in Thailand, a decrease in ϵ generates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in aid eﬀectiveness because the
denominator AID is small and hence a modest change in AID leads to a large change in g/AID
(AID is small in Thailand because pg and T are small). A rise in ϵ from 0.5 to 1 decreases T in
20all countries, as shown in the seventh column, although it has little impact on aid eﬀectiveness
in all countries except Thailand, as shown in the eighth column. Thus, a change in the eﬃciency
of government aﬀects the period during which aid is received but it has few repercussions for
aid eﬀectiveness.
In practice, although the eﬃciency of government can inﬂuence aid eﬀectiveness, it has
little eﬀect on the ranking of recipients according to aid eﬀectiveness. Suppose that only the
Philippines makes radical improvements in the eﬃciency of government (from 0.5 to 1). This
does not aﬀect aid eﬀectiveness at all, as shown in the table. Suppose instead that the eﬃciency
of government becomes worse only in Thailand (from 0.5 to 0.4). In this case, aid is still
most eﬀective in Thailand. These results have the following implications. Growth rates have
signiﬁcant implications for aid eﬀectiveness, but the eﬃciency of government has little eﬀect
because the impact of g on T is larger than that of ϵ. Hence, aid eﬀectiveness is low in a low-
growth country with an ineﬃcient government; even if the country can improve the eﬃciency of
government drastically, it has little impact on aid eﬀectiveness as long as the growth rate is low.
Our exercises therefore demonstrate that allocating more aid to countries with good policies
does not improve aid eﬀectiveness signiﬁcantly. The key policy implication of our results is that
donors should allocate more resources for infrastructure investment to low-growth countries.
This allocation rule decreases T and improves aid eﬀectiveness in many countries; with total aid
ﬁxed, this rule enables more recipients to achieve ﬁnancial independence earlier.
Note that the impact of growth rates on aid eﬀectiveness in our model raises questions
about empirical evidence for aid eﬀectiveness in the literature. In many papers, the dependent
variable is the growth rate of recipients and aid is a regressor; in the regression analysis, the
coeﬃcient estimate on aid is interpreted as aid eﬀectiveness. However, if growth rates aﬀect aid
eﬀectiveness as in Figure 2, the assumption that the coeﬃcient is constant across countries is
not valid. In countries where the growth rate is high and close to the eﬃcient level, an increase
in infrastructure investment has little eﬀect on aid eﬀectiveness. If these high-growth countries
have good policies, the model suggests that the impact of aid is small in countries with good
policies. This may be part of the explanation of mixed evidence regarding aid eﬀectiveness.
216 Conclusions
In this paper, we have attempted to ﬁnd a policy that enhances aid eﬀectiveness. The key
feature we add to this simple growth model is that recipient countries are aid-dependent in the
early phase of their development but ultimately become independent. In this paper, since aid
ﬂows vary over time, we focus on the eﬀect of total aid in the long run instead of the eﬀect of
aid ﬂows in the short run. Moreover, we also consider a diﬀerence in inter-sectoral allocation in
the model.
Our main results are summarized as follows: 1) if a recipient has severer poverty problems
and a lower level of public capital, donors should choose a higher target rate of growth; 2) in
reality, the level of infrastructure investment is so low that it makes aid ineﬀective; 3) in the late
1980s, Japan’s contribution to public capital formation was large in certain Asian countries, but
its impact on aid eﬀectiveness is not necessarily associated with the volume of aid because aid
eﬀectiveness depends on growth rates; 4) although governance aﬀects aid eﬀectiveness, improving
it has a very small impact on aid eﬀectiveness in low-growth countries.
Our result that aid eﬀectiveness depends on growth rates has an important policy implication.
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002) suggest that donors should allocate
more to countries with good policies. Our model also suggests that governance aﬀects aid
eﬀectiveness. However, we also show that allocating more to countries with good policies is
not necessarily the best way to improve aid eﬀectiveness. Our numerical exercises suggest that
donors should allocate more to economic infrastructure in low-growth countries and focus on
governance only after recipients achieve a relatively high growth rate. As long as aid for economic
infrastructure can enhance growth, this allocation rule shortens the period during which aid is
required for many recipients, and hence, with total aid ﬁxed, this rule gives earlier ﬁnancial
independence to more recipients.
22References
Aschauer, D. A. (1989). Is public expenditure productive? Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 23(2), 177–200.
Barro, R. J. (1990). Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth. Journal of
Political Economy 98(5), 103–125.
Binswanger, H. P., S. R. Khandker, and M. R. Rosenzweig (1993). How infrastructure and ﬁnan-
cial institutions aﬀect agricultural output and investment in India. Journal of Development
Economics 41(2), 337–366.
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar (2000). Aid, policies, and growth. American Economic Review 90(4),
847–868.
Canning, D. (1999). Infrastructure’s Contribution to Aggregate Output. Policy Research Working
Paper Series 2246. The World Bank.
Canning, D. and P. Pedroni (2008). Infrastructure, long-run economic growth and causality
tests for cointegrated panels. Manchester School 76(5), 504–527.
Cassen, R. and Associates (1994). Does Aid Work? Report to an Intergovernmental Task Force
(2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chatterjee, S., G. Sakoulis, and S. J. Turnovsky (2003). Unilateral capital transfers, public
investment, and economic growth. European Economic Review 47(6), 1077–1103.
Chatterjee, S. and S. J. Turnovsky (2007). Foreign aid and economic growth: The role of ﬂexible
labor supply. Journal of Development Economics 84(1), 507–533.
Clemens, M. A., S. Radelet, and R. Bhavnani (2004). Counting Chickens When They Hatch:
The Short-Term Eﬀect of Aid on Growth. CGD Working Paper 44. Washington DC: Center
for Global Development.
Collier, P. and D. Dollar (2002). Aid allocation and poverty reduction. European Economic
Review 46, 1475–1500.
23Dalgaard, C.-J. and H. Hansen (2001). On aid, growth and good policies. Journal of Development
Studies 37(6), 17–41.
Dalgaard, C.-J., H. Hansen, and F. Tarp (2004). On the empirics of foreign aid and growth.
Economic Journal 114(496), F191–F216.
Diwan, I. (2001). Debt as Sweat: Labor, Financial Crises, and the Globalization of Capital.
mimeo. The World Bank.
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2002). Growth is good for the poor. Journal of Economic Growth 7,
195–225.
Easterly, W. (1999). The ghost of ﬁnancing gap: testing the growth model used in the interna-
tional ﬁnancial institutions. Journal of Development Economics 60(2), 423–438.
Easterly, W., R. Levine, and D. Roodman (2004). Aid, policies, and growth: Comment. Amer-
ican Economic Review 94(3), 774–780.
Easterly, W. and S. Rebelo (1993). Fiscal policy and economic growth: An empirical investiga-
tion. Journal of Monetary Economics 32(3), 417–458.
Ford, R. and P. Poret (1991). Infrastructure and Private-Sector Productivity. OECD Working
Paper no.91. OECD.
Fraumeni, B. M. (1997, July). The measurement of depreciation in the U.S. national income
and product accounts. Survey of Current Business, 7–23.
Futagami, K., Y. Morita, and A. Shibata (1993). Dynamic analysis of an endogenous growth
model with public capital. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95(4), 607–25.
Gomanee, K., O. Morrissey, P. Mosley, and A. Verschoor (2005). Aid, government expenditure,
and aggregate welfare. World Development 33(3), 355–370.
Gupta, S., B. Clements, E. Baldacci, and C. Mulas-Granados (2005). Fiscal policy, expendi-
ture composition, and growth in low-income countries. Journal of International Money and
Finance 24(3), 441–463.
24Harrison, A. E. (2002). Has Globalization Eroded Labor’s Share? Some Cross-Country Evidence.
mimeo.
Kalaitzidakis, P. and S. Kalyvitis (2008). On the growth implications of foreign aid for public
investment co-ﬁnancing. Review of Development Economics 12(2), 354–371.
Kawai, M. and S. Takagi (2004). Japan’s oﬃcial development assistance: recent issues and
future directions. Journal of International Development 16, 255–280.
Lensink, R. and H. White (2001). Are there negative returns to aid? Journal of Development
Studies 37(6), 42–65.
Mosley, P., J. Hudson, and A. Verschoor (2004). Aid, poverty reduction and the ‘new condition-
ality’. Economic Journal 114(496), 217–243.
Neanidis, K. C. and D. Varvarigos (2007). The Allocation of Volatile Aid and Economic Growth:
Evidence and a Suggestive Theory. Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series. Lough-
borough Univesrity.
Paternostro, S., A. Rajaram, and E. R. Tiongson (2007). How does the composition of public
spending matter? Oxford Development Studies 35, 47–82.
Rajan, R. G. and A. Subramanian (2008). Aid and growth: What does the cross-country
evidence really show? Review of Economics and Statistics 90(4), 643–665.
Rajkumar, A. S. and V. Swaroop (2008). Public spending and outcomes: Does governance
matter? Journal of Development Economics 86(1), 96–111.
Ravallion, M. and S. Chen (1997). What can new survey data tell us about recent changes in
distribution and poverty? World Bank Economic Review 11(2), 357–382.
Roodman, D. (2007). The anarchy of numbers: Aid, development, and cross-country empirics.
World Bank Economic Review 21(2), 255–277.
Senhadji, A. (2000). Sources of economic growth: An extensive growth accounting exercise. IMF
Staﬀ Papers 47(1), 129–158.
25Straub, S. (2008). Infrastructure and Development : A Critical Appraisal of the Macro Level
Literature. Policy Research Working Paper 4590. The World Bank.
Svensson, J. (2000). Foreign aid and rent-seeking. Journal of International Economics 51,
437–461.
Tanzi, V. and H. H. Zee (2000). Tax policy for emerging markets - developing countries. National
Tax Journal 52, 299–322.
26Figure 1: Time path of aid ﬂows
27Figure 2: Target growth rate and aid eﬀectiveness
28Figure 3: Target growth rate and period of receiving aid
29n z pg τ δ δG ϵ ɹ β γ ɹ r σ A G0 L0
0.015 456 0.11 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.5 0.95 -1.5 0.1 0.65 2 0.4 1 ɹ
Table 1: Parameters
30ɹ ɹ g ɹ ɹ T ɹɹ AID 100 · g/AID
Benchmark 0.027 116 1 0.009
0.03 108 1.002 0.010
0.04 88 1.006 0.013
0.05 75 1.007 0.016
0.06 67 1.005 0.020
0.07 60 1.003 0.023
0.08 55 0.999 0.026
0.09 52 0.995 0.030
0.10 48 0.991 0.033
0.15 39 0.972 0.051
0.18 36 0.968 0.061
0.20 36 0.971 0.068
0.23 37 0.997 0.076
0.25 41 1.061 0.078
0.28 60 2.841 0.033
Table 2: Target growth rate and aid eﬀectiveness
31ɹ ɹ ϵ ɹ ɹ T ɹɹ AID 100 · g/AID
0.3 136 1.029 0.0087
0.4 125 1.014 0.0088
Benchmark 0.5 116 1 0.0089
0.6 110 0.986 0.0090
0.7 104 0.971 0.0092
0.8 99 0.957 0.0093
0.9 94 0.942 0.0095
1 90 0.928 0.0096
Table 3: Eﬃciency of government and aid eﬀectiveness
32ɹ ɹ τ ɹ ɹ T ɹɹ AID 100 · g/AID
0.05 139 1.032 0.0086
Benchmark 0.10 116 1 0.0089
0.15 105 0.975 0.0091
0.20 99 0.956 0.0093
0.25 95 0.944 0.0094
0.30 93 0.937 0.0095
0.35 92 0.934 0.0095
0.40 93 0.936 0.0095
0.45 94 0.942 0.0095
0.50 97 0.951 0.0094
Table 4: Tax and aid eﬀectiveness
33Recipient g n G0 pg ρJ T 100 · g/AID
Bangladesh 0.031 0.020 0.1 0.144 0.036
252 0.0069
without ρJ 0.029 269 0.0064
Cambodia 0.061 0.024 0.1 0.126 0.664
131 0.0147
without ρJ 0.004 1849 0.0010
China 0.088 0.009 0.2 0.166 0.185
94 0.0193
without ρJ 0.067 117 0.0147
Indonesia 0.034 0.014 0.2 0.105 0.095
201 0.0111
without ρJ 0.028 242 0.0092
Philippines 0.014 0.022 0.2 0.069 0.142
443 0.0063
without ρJ 0.008 767 0.0036
Thailand 0.041 0.010 0.5 0.017 0.207
104 0.0885
without ρJ 0.027 150 0.0582
Table 5: Contribution of Japan’s infrastructure investment
34Benchmark -0.01 in g -0.1 in ϵ +0.5 in ϵ
Recipient T 100 · g/AID T 100 · g/AID T 100 · g/AID T 100 · g/AID
Bangladesh 252 0.0069 368 0.0047 260 0.0069 230 0.0069
China 94 0.0193 104 0.0171 99 0.0193 83 0.0194
Indonesia 201 0.0111 280 0.0078 208 0.0111 180 0.0111
Cambodia 131 0.0147 155 0.0123 135 0.0147 119 0.0147
Philippines 443 0.0063 1523 0.0018 459 0.0063 393 0.0063
Thailand 104 0.0885 132 0.0668 110 0.0878 85 0.0917
Table 6: Eﬀect of changes in g and ϵ
35